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In a passage from A Defence of Poetry (1821), to which this essay will return at its close, Shelley traces a seemingly inevitable process by which language loses its initial energy of metaphorical life. Of 'poets' he declares:
Their language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations of things, and perpetuates their apprehension, until the words which represent them become through time signs for portions and classes of thoughts, instead of pictures of integral thoughts; and then, if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganized, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse. 1 It is for providing 'pictures of integral thoughts' that Shelley values 'vitally metaphorical' language, for imaging thoughts as accessible and entire entities rather than as 'signs'. But in fact he is able to turn the entropic decline from 'pictures' to 'signs' to his creative advantage. In an immediate upswing, the 'nobler purposes' referred to here as involved in the discovery of 'new relations' find their advocate in Bacon, who is said to speak of the likenesses found by the poet as 'the same footsteps of nature impressed upon the various subjects of the world'. 2 * * * The fear that language will grow 'disorganized' and the need for poets to 'create afresh' weave in and out of one another. It is because of this fear and this need that 'Apprehension', in Ross Wilson's words, 'itself must be alive'. 3 Language's very frailty and inadequacy-Shelley's sense, as he puts it in one of his brief, fragmentary 'Speculations on Morals and Metaphysics', that 'Our words are dead, our thoughts are cold & borrowed', or that 'Words are the instruments of mind . . . , but they are not mind, nor are they portions of mind'-provide the tinder which ignites his prose into eloquent, counter-active flame. 4 That sense of language's deficiencies helps to explain why his prose is that of a poet, concerned, like Plato, 'to kindle a harmony in thoughts', 5 aware that 'harmony' involves both a necessary awareness of the possibility of discord and a commitment to the imagination: 'there is a principle within the human being . . . which acts otherwise than in the lyre, and produces not melody alone, but harmony'. 6 Harmony involves responsiveness and adjustment, a thinking through the language being used, with a full recognition of its constraints and possibilities, and a strong awareness that meaning is being wrought into glowing but provisional being in the act of 'communicating and receiving intense and impassioned conceptions respecting man and nature', Shelley's account of what poetry is towards the end of A Defence of Poetry. 7 His attunement to the literary quality of thinking is a major reason why, as James Donelan has it in a recent review, 'Shelley has long defied attempts to create a systemic account of his thought in criticism.' 8 A central argument in this essay, which draws examples from Shelley's metaphysical, political, religious, and literary critical writings between 1816 and 1821, is that his prose, like his verse, is poetic to the degree that it builds on his belief, ably explored by William Keach, that 'language is arbitrarily produced by the Imagination and has relation to thoughts alone'. 9 On Life (1819), conscripted by Earl through an assonantal off-chime between 'abandon' and 'wonder', and through a full rhyme between 'we grow dizzy' and 'how little we know' (emphases added). Such effects suggest an acute linguistic self-awareness at the very moment that Shelley imagines words leaving us in the lurch.
Throughout On Life, to be reduced to ignorance is to be saved from 'an education of error', caused by the mind's misplaced confidence in structures that it imposes on itself through 'the misuse of words and signs, the instruments of its own creation'.
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In its place, Shelley works to persuade us and himself of an idealism which he sees as creating a vacancy to be filled with imaginings that take their life and newness from the view that 'nothing exists but as it is perceived' and the counter-view that 'Mind . .
. cannot create, it can only perceive'. 13 But the essay achieves its own creativity through its continual assaults on common understanding, including the use of words to suspend the meanings normally associated with them. The following passage allows one to see how Shelley manages such an assault and such a suspension:
Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of distinct individual minds, similar to that which is employed in now questioning its own nature, is likewise found to be a delusion. The relations of things remain unchanged by whatever system. 14 'Pursuing the same thread of reasoning'; 'questioning its own nature': thought is an active process, ongoing, living by and in the present participles that it generates. In proposing that 'the words I and you and they are grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement and totally devoid of the intense and exclusive sense usually attributed to them', Shelley intimates that 'life' is wholly different from the 'multitude of entangled thoughts' 15 which constitutes common-sense mental experience. Instead, he uses the fiction of his own individuality to propose, through a style that questions the validity of 'grammatical devices', the truth of 'the one mind'. Here the fact that language is a common property rather than the possession of an individual cleverly supports his argument, an argument that takes him with poetic rigour into a place where he contends that 'the existence of distinct individual minds similar to that which is employed in now questioning its own nature, is . . . found to be a delusion'.
The 'one mind' is a duplicitously uncertain and suggestive notion. It may be related to 'the popular notion in critical works of the period of "the public mind" . . . an atmosphere of common opinion within which all think and act', which Timothy Clark suggestively offers as a gloss. At the same time, it points towards a concept that jars with any idea of 'common opinion'. 16 For Shelley, language imagines the abolition of distinctions which it seems crucially part of linguistic structures to sustain. His words perform a serendipitous trick: they convey the idea of a 'distinct individual mind'
(which from a strictly philosophical perspective is 'a delusion') and they adumbrate an all-subsuming yet elusive 'one mind' from which the writer is debarred by his individuality and to which he is connected by language. Indeed, to the degree that language embraces, formulates, and refigures the idea of the 'one mind', it comes close to being its sole witness and guarantor. The style is one of solemn funeral performance, almost verging on parody: 'Clothe yourselves in solemn black. Let the bells be tolled. Think of mortality and change.'
There is a faint, unmistakable flicker of something sardonic in 'Spare no symbol of universal grief' or in the triple run of imperatives: 'Weep-mourn-lament'. All these are actions, the prose makes one feel, which a person might play; the passage adapts and resourcefully exploits the language of processional elegy. 27 It is as though Shelley were casting a cold eye on the capacity of his audience to be manipulated by language. Simultaneously he engages in exactly that, a process of manipulating his audience, as he moves towards the subversion of his climax: this is no young princess for whom sentimental dolour is being prescribed; it is an abstraction. Priestman cannily reads the 'public lamentation for Charlotte as the unconscious expression of a deeper suffering, which Shelley is bringing to the surface almost like a psychoanalyst'. 28 Shelley corporealizes an abstraction as though Liberty were the princess, but he works to make us grieve for an abstraction as though it had a reality even greater than a person. One of his manoeuvres is to interrupt the prose after the assertion that 'LIBERTY is dead' with a peremptory address: 'Slave! I charge thee disturb not the depth and solemnity of our grief by any meaner sorrow.' Peter
McDonald finds in Shelley's use of the word 'slave' an inability or a refusal to see that the word names 'a reality of servitude and suffering', but the word effects, in context, a salutary shock: there is 'a reality of servitude and suffering' in Shelley's England, and one of its traces is subjugation to the ideology of monarchy, an ideology that is at once unreal trappings and ceremony, and basis for an only too real state of injustice. 29 Those who mourn for Princess Charlotte and are indifferent to the death of Liberty are enslaved to an unjust political system responsible for the suffering of thousands.
Shelley's task is to bring home to his reader the recognition that Auden will embody in sonnet XVI from his sequence 'In Time of War', both that human beings, 'unlike an idea, can die too soon' and that 'ideas can be true although men die' so that 'we can watch a thousand faces / Made active by one lie'. 30 In thinking about 'aristocracy', Shelley takes a haughtily detached view:
'Mankind seem to acquiesce, as in a necessary condition of the imbecility of their own will and reason, in the existence of an aristocracy.' 43 This view builds on what might be called a linguistic history of the class: 'Since usage has consecrated a distortion of the word aristocracy from its primitive meaning, let me be allowed to employ the word aristocracy in that ordinary sense which signifies that class of persons who possess a right to the labour of others, without dedicating to the common service any labour in return.' 44 The existence of such a 'class of persons', Shelley goes on, 'is a prodigious anomaly in the social system'. 45 The 'primitive meaning' must be something like 'best power', 'best citizens', and one notes how Shelley harps on 'the word aristocracy', the phrase repeated twice, as though the author were intent on disarming it of its fascination while conceding, in the process of doing so, that the word is fascinating, needs to be disarmed. If it is disarmed, it is so by Shelley's very particular use of that species of subversive paraphrase he has already used in relation to the aristocracy as embodying 'in truth the interests of the rich'. 46 He goes on, there, to argue that 'Monarchy is only the string which ties the robber's bundle' in one of his sharp descents into a Cobbett-like, scornfully plain English. 47 But he is conscious that there is, in the word, something to exercise, even to their distortion, the more majestic faculties of the soul. Though at the bottom it is all trick, there is something frank and magnificent in the chivalrous disdain of infamy connected with a gentleman. There is something to which-until you see through the base falsehood upon which all inequality is founded-it is difficult for the imagination to refuse its respect, in the faithful and direct dealings of the substantial merchant. But in the habits and lives of this new aristocracy created out of an increase [in] the public calamities, and whose existence must be determined by their termination, there is nothing to qualify our disapprobation. 48 As indicated above, what follows suggests that Shelley ultimately feels that he is making a distinction without a real difference: the combined effects of both forms of aristocracy are harmful and unfair. But though his somethings and his nothing blend as well as clash, he engages in a drama of thought, a rehearsal of the arguments, a giving way in incidentals if not in main substance to a Burkean position, an acknowledgement that, in politics, faculties of soul and imagination have their place, cannot be wholly disregarded, must be attended to, if the 'trick' to which they often succumb is to be explained and exposed.
In A Philosophical View of Reform, arguing that 'That equality in possessions which Jesus Christ so passionately taught is a moral rather than political truth,' 49 Shelley asserts:
We may and ought to advert to it, as to the elementary principle, as to the goal, unattainable perhaps by us, but which, as it were, we revive in our posterity to pursue. We derive tranquillity and courage and grandeur of soul from contemplating an object which is, because we will it, and may be, because we hope and desire it, and must be, if succeeding generations of the enlightened sincerely and earnestly seek it. 50 This is a rhythm typical of Shelley's prose: one might call it, with the last stanza of Prometheus Unbound in mind, hope creating from its own wreck the thing it contemplates. The movement from the ideal that 'is, because we will it' to one that 'may be, because we hope and desire it' to one that 'must be, if succeeding generations . . . seek it' is stirring but also alert to the dynamics of will, hope, and desire. Momentarily the far-off ideal is made to seem the only possible goal we should seek to attain. However, the subsequent turn is also characteristic of Shelley: 'But our present business is with the difficult and unbending realities of actual life, and when we have drawn inspiration from the great object of our hope it becomes us with patience and resolution to apply ourselves to accommodating our theories to . . There is a Power by which we are surrounded, like the atmosphere in which some motionless lyre is sustained, which visits with its breath our silent chords at will.' 56 Beginning with a complex echo of Acts 17:28 that acknowledges dependence on a higher power, even if that power may be internal, it seems no accident that this different sense of God (Shelley will go on to say 'This power is God') is inextricable from an account of poetic inspiration. 57 Later Shelley will shift into a more conceptual mode, as he brings humanity and God into alignment, asserting that 'The perfection of the human and the divine character is thus asserted to be the same', though at this stage he is paraphrasing Jesus's teaching. 58 In offering its own account of Christ's teaching, the essay gives itself room to explore Shelley's own thinking, while allowing for a gap between the two. And not just Shelley's thinking; thought here is deeply entangled with hope and desire:
We die, says Jesus Christ; and, when we awaken from the languor of disease, the glories and the happiness of Paradise are around us. All evil and pain have ceased for eve ... Our happiness also corresponds with and is adapted to, the nature of … what is most excellent in our being. We see God, and we see that he is good. How delightful a picture even if it be not true! How magnificent and illustrious is the conception which this bold theory suggests to the contemplation, even if it be no more than the imagination of some sublimest and most holy poet, who, impressed with the loveliness and majesty of his own nature, is impatient, discontented, with the narrow limits which this imperfect life, and the dark grave have assigned forever as his melancholy portion. 59 The passage plays the delights of hope against a sober sense of likely reality in the exclamatory 'How delightful a picture even if it be not true!' A doubleness of feeling courses through the writing. So, the phrase 'no more than the 'imagination of some sublimest and most holy poet' typifies the subtlety that pervades the writing; beneath sadness at the sway exercised by the reality principle is a final twist that suggests that the matter is seen as it is because of 'narrow limits'. The reader is pulled between melancholy and a recognition of the value of the 'imagination of some sublimest and most holy poet'. The final effect, that is, of 'the narrow limits which this imperfect life, and the dark grave have assigned forever as his melancholy portion' is as much protesting rejection as acquiescence. Gavin Hopps is persuasive when he argues that 'What we can see here, then, is the poet yearning in spite of himself for something he can't quite allow himself to believe in, which in turn won't allow his disbelief sovereignty either.' 60 If the writing bears witness to a residually conflicted aspect to Shelley's view of Christianity, it makes for prose that engages us in ways that theological and philosophical argument often fails to do. The text is knowingly scored through with longing and struggle. This desire to be forever as we are, this reluctance to a violent and unexperienced change, which is common to all the animate and inanimate combinations of the universe, is indeed the secret persuasion which has given birth to the opinion of a future state. Love proposes as an ideal the self's 'discovery of its antitype', an oddly unimpassioned phrase that quickly moves into something more impassioned without ever losing the sense that we are within the mind imagining love as a restless quest presided over by a force that will brook no 'rest or respite': 'this is the invisible and unattainable point to which Love tends; and to attain which it urges forth the powers of man to arrest the faintest shadow of that without the possession of which there is no rest or respite to the heart over which it rules'. 73 The conflict between 'unattainable' and 'to attain which' generates an undertow of pathos as the sentence mimics, almost remorselessly, a pursuit that is gloriously doomed from the start.
Style at such moments functions as a mode of thought, moving beyond the language of empirical philosophy to a more inwardly impassioned and poetic form of enquiry, in accord with Shelley's view that 'We do not attend sufficiently to what passes within ourselves.' 74 In A Defence of Poetry Shelley rejects the idea that a poet must rely on 'metre, or a certain system of traditional forms of harmony and language', and argues that 'The distinction between poets and prose-writers is a vulgar error.' He includes under the banner of poetry the writings of Plato, Cicero, and Bacon, contending that Plato 'forebore to invent any regular plan of rhythm which would include, under determinate forms, the varied pauses of his style'. In any potential combat between 'varied pauses' and 'determinate forms' this judgement awards the victory to the former. 75 Shelley's essay asks to be read not simply as a statement but rather as an exalted and energizing enactment. Responding to his friend Thomas Love Peacock's wittily provocative dismissal in The Four Ages of Poetry of poetry as 'the mental rattle that awakened the attention of intellect in the infancy of civil society', 76 Shelley defends poetry against rationalist critique by using an array of tropes, rhythmic devices, bewitching images-often proceeding less to clothe an idea in a figure than to abolish or question the binary division between thought and word. If there is a pull in earlier work by Shelley towards seeing words in a Lockean fashion, as, in Paul Fry's phrasing, 'arbitrary signs that obscure the pure essence of thought', the import of A Defence is that again, to quote Fry, as he bends to his own ends a half-line from Prometheus Unbound (2.4.116), 'the deep truth is not imageless but an image'. 77 To return to the passage with which this essay began, poetry is 'vitally metaphorical'; 'it marks the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension', where the rapid dance of bunching, lengthening sound similarities duplicates the effort to perpetuate apprehension through metaphor. But the sentence goes on, mimicking in its syntactical falling away the semantic entropy it describes, to depict a deforming 'until': 'until the words which represent them become through time signs for portions and classes of thoughts, instead of pictures of integral thoughts; and then if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganized, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse'. 78 The 'harmony in thoughts' does not preclude shifts, collisions of perspective (between in Abrams's terms) 'two planes of thought in Shelley's aesthetics-one Platonistic and mimetic, the other psychological and expressive-applied alternately, as it were', as Abrams notes with an alertness to Shelley's mobility of suggestion, 'to each of the major topics under discussion'. 79 Sometimes Shelley foregrounds this alternating, as when he teases us in and out of thought through a speedy interplay of complementary, near-contradictory images; 'And whether it [poetry] spreads its own figured curtain or withdraws life's dark veil from before the scene of things, it equally creates for us a being within our being.' 80 That 'or' is also an 'and' since Shelley makes us recognize in the sentence the need for the 'figured curtain', a need present in
